Annapolis Peace Conference (2007)

Summary: On November 27, 2007, President George Bush convened what was called the Annapolis Peace Conference at the U.S. Naval Academy. The meeting brought together the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority, leaders from several neighboring Arab states (including Saudi Arabia) and others. The explicit goal was to launch a round of negotiations that would end in an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord by the end of 2008 based on the "two state solution," i.e. establishment of an independent, sovereign state of Palestine that would peacefully coexist next to Israel. After the meeting in Annapolis, formal talks between the Israelis and Palestinians resumed on January 15, 2008, even as Hamas continued to fire rockets into Israel, prompting threats of retaliation. On the Israeli side, the Yisrael Beitenu party resigned from the governing coalition of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to protest resumption of peace talks while attacks were continuing. Olmert's resignation as prime minister in September 2008 necessitated the scheduling of new parliamentary elections for February 2009--and dashed hopes that the Annapolis conference would achieve a settlement before Bush left office on January 20, 2009. In January 2009 Israel sent troops into Gaza to halt rocket attacks, and the next month Israeli parliamentary elections resulted in a shift to the right. In April 2009 the newly installed Israeli foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, declared that commitments to a two-state solution made by Olmert at Annapolis were not binding on the new government, effectively bringing to an end the most recent in a string of interim agreements that fell short of a permanent peace.

A new attempt to negotiate a settlement of the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict was launched by the administration of President George W. Bush at a conference at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, on November 27, 2007. The conference included representatives from several Arab states that had long been on the periphery of the six-decades-long conflict, but did not include two major players: Hamas, the Palestinian organization effectively running the Gaza Strip, and its main state sponsor, Iran. The meeting in Annapolis was intended to set the stage for negotiations that would lead to a comprehensive peace agreement based on the "two state solution" (separate independent states of Palestine and Israel) by the time President Bush left office in January 2009.

On January 15, 2008, Israel and the Palestinian authority returned for follow-up talks following the Annapolis conference. Beforehand, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared, "I'm not sure we can reach an agreement, and I'm not sure we can reach its implementation." He spoke in light of continuing attacks on Israel by Hamas--in the form of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel--and consequent criticism by Israeli politicians for entering into talks before an effective cease-fire had been achieved. In the days immediately before the second round of talks, Hamas had fired up to 70 rockets a day into Israel from Gaza. Olmert's majority in parliament had been reduced when one coalition partner, the Yisrael Beitenu party, withdrew its support (11 seats in parliament) to protest holding talks without a ceasefire by Hamas.

At the heart of the Annapolis conference was the so-called "two state solution"--the vision of two sovereign states, Israel and Palestine, peacefully coexisting side by side (see separate Background Information Summary in this database). The Annapolis conference also represented a break with the long-stalled process known as the "road map," which had envisioned step-by-step progress towards an overall settlement premised on the complete cessation of attacks on Israel. Hamas, which won Palestinian elections in 2006 and the next year came to rule over Gaza while continuing to countenance periodic rocket attacks on southern Israeli towns, had brought the road map process to a halt.

Bush made a tour of the Middle East coinciding with the new round of talks. In Jerusalem on January 11, 2008, Bush outlined his vision of a peace agreement that would include "mutually agreed adjustments to the armistice lines of 1949 to reflect current realities and to ensure that the Palestinian state is viable and contiguous" and compensation for Palestinians and their descendants for property left behind at the formation of Israel almost exactly 60 years ago.

Bush's tour included stops in Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, during which he promoted a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and also emphasized his view that Iran presented a threat to stability and peace in the region. Bush appeared to be pursuing a dual agenda: forming an alliance of Arab states with the United States against Iran, as well as promoting a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

This larger vision failed to take firm hold in either Israel or the Gaza Strip. A week after Bush's speech 11 members of the right-wing Yisrael Beitenu party withdrew from the coalition government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to protest against resumption of peace talks. The withdrawal reduced Olmert's coalition to 67 seats (out of 120). The political movement came on the same day that Olmert vowed to "wage war" against Hamas militants who continued to fire rockets into Israel from Gaza, further complicating prospects for progress in the peace talks.

A separate and unrelated development--allegations of corruption by Olmert--led to his resignation as prime minister in September. Olmert's foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, won a Kadima Party primary election in September to succeed him as party leader, but in October she concluded she could not hold together a coalition in parliament, and announced she was recommending that new elections be held. That announcement eliminated the prospect that the Annapolis initiative could result in a peace agreement before Bush left office in January 2009.

Further dimming the prospects that the Annapolis conference would lead to a peace agreement was the invasion of Gaza by the Israeli army in January 2009 (see separate Background Information Summary in this database).

In the Israeli elections (see separate Background Information Summary in this database), the conservative Likud Party of former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu made major gains, emerging as the second-largest bloc in the Knesset, and Netanyahu was invited to form a new coalition. The new government took office at the end of March 2009. The new foreign minister was Avigdor Lieberman, founder of Yisrael Beitenu--the party that withdrew from Olmert's coalition to protest resumption of peace talks in early 2008. On the day he took office Lieberman declared that the new government would not be bound by any commitments to the Annapolis process--and the two-state solution--made by Olmert 16 months earlier.

(At the same time, the new administration of President Barack Obama reiterated the American commitment to the two-state solution.)

Context. The Annapolis conference represented the latest in a long string of meetings between the two sides, dating to the administration of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). It was the first time the administration of George Bush had hosted such a conference.

Several analysts suggested that some Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, might have been motivated to attend as a means of countering the growing regional influence of Sunni Islamist radicals and of Iran, a Shi'ite power. Iran was not invited to the conference. Also absent from the conference were two organizations closely tied to Iran--Hamas, the Palestinian organization that controls the Gaza Strip in competition with the Palestinian Authority headed by president Mahmoud Abbas, and Hezbollah, the Shiite militia and political party in Lebanon whose attacks sparked an Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006. All three of these entities have played a major role in unrest in the region.

News reports focused particularly on the presence in Annapolis of Saudi Arabia's foreign minister, Saud al-Faisal, whose presence represented the highest-ranking Saudi official ever to attend a meeting with Israel, although the Saudi representative had said beforehand that he would not shake hands with the Israeli prime minister.

The presence of Syria's deputy foreign minister, Fayssal Mekdad, had been the subject of speculation until his arrival just before the conference opened. Syria has its own bilateral issues with Israel--notably the continuing Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights--as well as a perceived close relationship with Iran. In Lebanon, a deadlock between pro-Western and pro-Syrian factions has so far prevented choosing a replacement for former President Emile Lahoud, who left office at the end of his term just days before the Annapolis conference opened. Subsequent to the Annapolis conference, Israeli and Syrian negotiators met in Turkey, with the help of Turkish mediators shuttling between hotel rooms, in what was presented as a prospect for a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. This initiative also was put on hold by Olmert's resignation in September 2008.

The Annapolis Conference. Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya had been invited to attend the Annapolis meeting, but did not send representatives.

Other attendees included Sunni-dominated Arab states, such as the Gulf emirates, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco--which as a group represented relatively moderate Arab states challenged for influence by non-Arab, non-Sunni Iran. Several of these states have no diplomatic relations with Israel. Some commentators suggested that fear of Iran was a more powerful motivation than a desire to settle the Israeli-Palestinian battle that has gone on for 60 years. In that view, the Annapolis Conference was less of an Israeli-Palestinian peace effort than a coming together of parties wishing to ally themselves in opposition to Islamist extremism and Iranian influence. For example, in his comments to reporters, the Saudi foreign minister remarked that "stagnation in the peace process has increased the appeal of extremist ideologies. Feelings of despair and frustration have reached a dangerously high level."

President Bush announced at the start of the meeting that Israel and the Palestinian Authority had agreed on a framework for forthcoming negotiations, an agreement that, some news reports said, was hammered out as late as 4 A.M. before the meeting started. In that agreement the two sides promised to try to negotiate all outstanding differences over the next 13 months. Among the most nettlesome issues are the status of Palestinian refugees who fled Israel in 1948, the status of Jewish settlements on the West Bank, and the status of Jerusalem.

The agreed framework for negotiations declared that Israel and the Palestinian Authority "agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements. We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations, and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008." The framework envisioned bi-weekly meetings between Olmert and Abbas. A steering committee was to be established by December 12, 2007, to work out details of the negotiations.

The framework represented at least one concession by Israel: to negotiate a final peace agreement before the achievement of preconditions. In 2003, a failed peace initiative by the Bush administration had envisioned a three-stage "roadmap" to peace, starting with the end of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Palestinian cooperation in ending terrorist attacks on Israel. A final peace agreement was made conditional on completion of these two goals, but in Annapolis the two sides agreed to proceed directly to final peace negotiations.

On the other hand, the Israelis had insisted on referring to recognition of Israel as a "homeland for the Jewish people," whereas the Palestinians insisted on referring to a "two-state solution." The agreed statement instead referred to "two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side," suggesting to some observers that the two sides remain far apart on the most fundamental issues in the conflict.

Bush indicated that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice would be the primary American diplomat overseeing forthcoming negotiations. The president himself spent about three hours in Annapolis before returning to Washington--a reflection, in the eyes of some analysts, of his reluctance during his administration to become personally involved in negotiations, as had his predecessor, Bill Clinton, and Jimmy Carter before that.

The State Department provided a list of 53 attendees at the conference:

  • Israel: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
  • Palestinian Authority: President Mahmoud Abbas
  • United States: President George W. Bush
  • European Union: Benita Ferrero-Waldner, external affairs commissioner
  • European Union: Javier Solana, high representative for common foreign and security policy, secretary general of the council of the European Union
  • European Union: Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado
  • Russia: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
  • United Nations: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
  • "Quartet" Representative: Tony Blair, Middle East envoy
  • Algeria: Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci
  • Bahrain: Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa
  • Egypt: Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit
  • Jordan: Foreign Minister Salaheddine al-Bashir
  • Lebanon: Foreign Minister Tarek Mitri
  • Morocco: Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri
  • Qatar: Foreign Minister Ahmed bin Abdulla Al-Mahmoud
  • Saudi Arabia: Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal
  • Sudan: Ambassador John Ukec
  • Syria: Deputy Foreign Minister Fayssal Mekdad
  • Tunisia: Foreign Minister Abdelwahab Abdallah
  • Yemen: Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi
  • Arab League: Secretary General Amr Moussa
  • Canada: Foreign Minister Maxime Bernier
  • China: Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
  • France: Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner
  • Germany: Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier
  • Italy: Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema
  • Japan: Tatsuo Arima, special envoy for the Middle East
  • United Kingdom: Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs David Miliband
  • Brazil: Foreign Minister Celso Amorim
  • Denmark: Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller
  • Greece: Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis
  • India: Kapil Sibal, minister of science and technology and earth sciences
  • Indonesia: Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda
  • Malaysia: Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar
  • Mauritania: Foreign Minister Mohamed Ahmed Ould Mohamed Lemine
  • Mexico: Foreign Relations Undersecretary Lourdes Aranda
  • Netherlands: Frans Timmermans, minister for European affairs
  • Norway: Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Store
  • Organization of the Islamic Conference: Secretary-General Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu
  • Oman: Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdulla
  • Pakistan: Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan
  • Poland: Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski
  • Senegal: Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio
  • Slovenia: Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel
  • South Africa: Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma
  • Spain: Minister of Foreign Affairs Miguel Angel Moratinos
  • Sweden: Foreign Minister Carl Bildt
  • Turkey: Ali Babacan, foreign minister and chief EU negotiator
  • United Arab Emirates: Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan
  • Vatican: Pietro Parolin, undersecretary of foreign affairs
  • International Monetary Fund: Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn
  • World Bank: President Robert Zoellick

Text of the framework for negotiations agreed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the outset of the Annapolis Peace Conference:

The representatives of the government of the state of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), represented respectively by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas, in his capacity as chairman of the PLO executive committee and president of the Palestinian Authority, have convened in Annapolis, Maryland, under the auspices of President George W. Bush of the United States of America, and with the support of the participants of this international conference having concluded the following joint understanding: We express our determination to bring an end to bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict between our peoples; to usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition; to propagate a culture of peace and non-violence; to confront terrorism and incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. In furtherance of the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, we agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral (negotiations) in order to conclude a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements. We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. For this purpose, a steering committee led jointly by the head of the delegation of each party will meet continuously as agreed. The steering committee will develop a joint work plan and establish and oversee the work of negotiations teams to address all issues, to be headed by one lead representative from each party. The first session of the steering committee will be held on December 12, 2007. President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert will continue to meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up the negotiations in order to offer all necessary assistance for their advancement. The parties also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict issued by the quartet on 30 April, 2003 and agree to form an American, Palestinian and Israeli mechanism led by the United States to follow up on the implementation of the roadmap. The parties further commit to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the roadmap until they reach a peace treaty. The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitment of both sides of the roadmap. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the roadmap, as judged by the United States.