Bali Nightclub Bombing
The Bali Nightclub Bombing occurred on October 12, 2002, in the tourist district of Kuta, Bali, Indonesia, and was a tragic act of terrorism attributed to the Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah. The dual bombings resulted in the deaths of 202 people, including a significant number of foreign nationals, such as Australians, British, and Americans, and injured around 200 others. The first explosion was from a suicide bomber in a bar, followed shortly by a larger blast from a bomb hidden in a van outside the Sari Club. The attack was part of Jemaah Islamiyah's broader agenda to facilitate the establishment of an Islamist regime in Southeast Asia. In response to the attack, Indonesian authorities arrested several individuals linked to the bombing, and three main perpetrators were executed in 2008 after lengthy legal proceedings. The bombing had a substantial impact on global perceptions of terrorism in Indonesia, leading to increased international cooperation to combat terrorism and a reevaluation of the country’s security policies. Despite initial fears of adverse effects on tourism, the Bali region's tourism industry managed to remain relatively resilient in the aftermath. The incident also sparked discussions about the political dynamics within Indonesia, including the influence of radical Islamist groups and the historical context of U.S.-Indonesia relations.
Bali Nightclub Bombing
Summary: A terrorist bombing blamed on the Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) killed 202 people in and near a nightclub on the Indonesian island of Bali on October 12, 2002. Among the victims were many foreigners, including Australians, British, and Americans. The attack was viewed as part of a broader campaign to establish an Islamist regime throughout Southeast Asia. Three men were arrested and convicted of carrying out the attack. After many delays, they were executed in November 2008. A second, much smaller, bombing occurred three years later, also on Bali, killing 20 people. Neither attack appeared to have a significant impact on Indonesia's lucrative tourist trade, or on the fate of Jemaah Islamiyah.
Date: October 12, 2002.
Place: Kuta, on the island of Bali, Indonesia.
The Incident
At 11:05 p.m. on October 12, 2002, a suicide bomber detonated a bomb hidden inside a backpack inside a bar in the tourist town of Kuta on Indonesia's Bali island. Patrons of the bar fled into the street where a short time later (estimates range from 15 seconds to a few minutes) an enormous bomb inside a van exploded in front of another nightclub, the Sari Club. The force of the second explosion killed 202 people, including 89 Australians, 38 Indonesians, 26 British, and 7 Americans, and injured another 200. Windows throughout the town were shattered and the bomb left a crater about 36 inches deep.
Casualties overwhelmed the local hospital and many of the injured had to be flown by the Royal Australian Air Force to Darwin, Australia, and other cities for treatment of severe burns.
Perpetrators/Suspects
Authorities blamed Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) (see separate Background Information Summary in this database), a designated terrorist organization dedicated to establishing a fundamentalist Islamist state across Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. JI is believed to have close ties to Al Qaeda, which claimed responsibility for the Bali bombing in November 2005.
Shortly after the attack Abu Bakar Bashir (sometimes spelled Ba'asyir), thought to be JI's spiritual leader and an instigator in the bombing, denied that JI was responsible. Bashir was eventually brought to trial on minor charges in connection with the Bali bombing and was sentenced to 2-1/2 years in prison.
Detective work at the scene led to the arrests--and eventual executions--of three men in connection with the bombing. The owner of the van used in the attack, Amrozi bin Haji Nurhasyim (known as Amrozi), admitted his involvement and said the attack was part of jihad. Police found evidence that he had purchased about a ton of potassium chlorate (used for fertilizer) for the main bomb. Amrozi was eventually convicted and sentenced to death.
Amrozi's brother, Ali Imron, was also accused of complicity and sentenced to life in prison.
Abdul Aziz, also known as Imam Samudra, was identified by Amrozi as the ringleader of the bombing. He was arrested while waiting to catch a ferry to neighboring Malaysia, charged, and sentenced to death.
Mukhlas (many Indonesians have a single name), a cleric known also as Ali Gufron, was tried on charges that he instigated, planned, and funded the attack. He too was convicted and sentenced to death.
On November 9, 2008, the three men convicted five years earlier-- Imam Samudra, Amrozi and Mukhlas, also known as Ali Ghufron--were executed by firing squad. Their executions had been delayed many times for fears of a political or terrorist backlash. These fears were somewhat diminished over time as the government arrested or killed many leaders of JI. When their bodies arrived at their hometown, on the island of East Java, several thousand demonstrators met the bodies and shouted protests.
News reports named a fourth man, Ryuduan bin Isomuddin (widely known as Hambali; see separate Background Information Summary in this database) as playing a key role in the Bali bombing. Hambali is thought by American officials to have been the operational chief of JI until his arrested by Americans in Thailand in August 2003. He has been held in U.S. custody and not been brought to trial.
Broader Impact
The Bali bombing sparked a strong reaction by Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation, which came under intense international pressure to take more effective action against terrorist groups thought to be operating in the country.
Indonesia agreed to let agents of the FBI and police experts from Australia, Britain, and Japan enter the country to aid in the investigation. The government also issued a regulation under which terrorist suspects may be detained without trial for up to six months.
Internationally JI was listed as a terrorist organization by both the United States and the United Nations. This designation obligated member states to take specific actions against it such as freezing its assets. American officials have complained that Indonesian law and administration were not fully capable of carrying out such sanctions despite the government's willingness to do so.
In the broader Indonesian society the Bali bombing may have served to further isolate the more radical Islamist organizations operating in the country, including JI and Laskar Jihad. While these groups did not enjoy widespread support, they did receive at least some sympathy in the context of popular attitudes supporting Palestinians against Israel--sympathy further supported by anti-American sentiments. The Bali bombing, however, was thought by some analysts to have undercut popular support for radical Islamists. Two Islamic mass organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, expressed support for the government action against alleged terrorists.
The Bali attack also raised questions about the future viability of the tourist trade on Bali, one of Indonesia's less developed areas. Before the bombing Bali accounted for about 40% of Indonesian income from tourism (worth about $5 billion per year in total). Tourism is among Indonesia's main sources of foreign income.
Shortly after the bombing tourist arrivals remained steady, although growth in tourism declined. The longer-term future of this industry remained in doubt.
History/Background
Popular opinion in Indonesia has long been conditioned by perceived interference in Indonesian affairs by the United States (in particular by the CIA) in the 1950s and 1960s, a legacy of the cold war when Indonesia's Sukarno was active in the "non-aligned" movement. Any popularly elected Indonesian politician is likely to be leery of being seen as too inclined to cooperate with Washington.
On top of this most Indonesians are Muslims, and are inclined to sympathize with their Palestinian coreligionists in their long-standing fight against Israel (and, by extension, Israel's principal ally, the United States).
Public reaction in Indonesia to the Bali bombing was not immediately condemnatory. Many Indonesians were inclined to blame the CIA or Israel's Mossad for having set off the bombs in an effort to cast aspersions on native Islamists.
Until the Bali bombing Indonesia had experienced about 40 terrorist bombings--none nearly so deadly or dramatic--but neither the public nor the government had been inclined to take action.
Some observers suggested that Indonesia's previous failure to take decisive action against groups accused of carrying out terrorist activities in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia reflected a broader political weakness of the government led by Megawati Sukarnoputri. (Megawati is the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president after independence from Holland.) Members of her government (e.g. Vice-President Hamza Haz, who leads the Islamic-oriented United Development Party) resisted joining the American war on terrorism as part of a larger anti-American sentiment.
Following the 9/11/2001 attacks in New York and Washington, the United States had put considerable pressure on Indonesia to take steps to assure that its territory could not be used as a base for future terrorism attacks.
Indonesia also faces domestic concerns that impact on its ability to combat terrorism. For example, the country has a long tradition of delaying legal moves when suspects are in the hospital; such was the case in the wake of the Bali bombings when Abu Bakar Bashir was admitted to a hospital and supporters surrounded the building to prevent his arrest.
The Indonesian military has also long been the object of widespread skepticism, believed to be hobbled by internal factionalism, corruption, and even incompetence--as well as accusations of human rights abuses in regions such as Aceh and Papua. (The military was even accused of complicity in the Bali bombings, an accusation that received widespread credibility in the immediate aftermath of the event.) On the other hand, Megawati has close political ties to the military and some observers think the Bali incident will serve to strengthen the hand of the military in any crackdown on terrorists.
Bibliography
Budijanto, Bambang. "Islam in Indonesia," Transformation 20:4 (October 2003) p. 216. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=11449877
Charlé, Suzanne. "Losing Friends in Indonesia," Nation, 277:22 (December 29, 2003) p. 19. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=11692872
Cochrane, Joe, et al. "A Captive's Secrets, Newsweek 142:8 (August 25, 2003) p. 53. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=10576718
Gee, John. "Deadly Amateurs Arrested by Indonesia in Wake of Bali Bombing," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 22:1 (January-February 2003) p. 32. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=8960434
Howell, Llewellyn D. "The Irony of Bali Terrorism," USA Today Magazine 131: 2692 (January 2003) p. 25. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=8858206
Khan, Adman R. "Preaching Jihad in a Peaceful Land," Maclean's 116:8 (February 24, 2003) p. 22. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=9129214
Kranz, Kathleen. "A Once Peaceful Place Shattered by Terror," Newsweek 140:23 (December 2, 2002) p. 17. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=8559824
Kuan Yew, Lee. "Islam and Democracy in Southeast Asia," Forbes 174:2 (July 26, 2004) p. 39. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=13729023
Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Jihad in Jakarta," Commentary. 117:5 (May 2004) p. 49. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=12945377
Sebastian, Leonard. "Indonesian state responses to September 11, the Bali bombings and the war in Iraq: sowing the seeds for an accommodationist Islamic framework?" Cambridge Review of International Affairs 16:3 (October 2003) p. 429. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=11093290
Shari, Michael, et al. "Fallout from Bali May Clobber Southeast Asia," Business Week Issue 3805 (October 28, 2002) p. 57. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=7567799
Suter, Keith. "Terror in Paradise: The Bali Bombing," Contemporary Review 281: 1644 (January 2003) p, 1. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=8933707
"Tackling Terror After the Bali Bombs," Asia Monitor: South East Asia Monitor 13:12 (December 2002) p. 1. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=8815034
Vaughn, Bruce, et al. "Terrorism in Southeast Asia," Congressional Research Service: Report; 2/7/2005, p. 1. http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&an=17703195