Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour

Italian politician

• Born: August 10, 1810
• Birthplace: Turin, Piedmont, French Empire (now in Italy)
• Died: June 6, 1861
• Place of death: Turin, Italy

As prime minister between 1852 and 1861, Cavour gave Piedmont the economic and diplomatic leadership of Italy and played a key role in the country’s political unification. He is generally regarded as the founder of modern Italy.

Early Life

Count Camillo Benso di Cavour (kah-VEWR) was the son of a woman, Adèle de Sellon, who had come from a line of wealthy Huguenots who had been expelled from France by Louis XIV and had settled in Geneva. His father, the Marquis Michele Benso di Cavour, was the head of an ancient noble family, a businessperson and administrator who rose to high office in the reactionary regime of Restoration Piedmont. Cavour soon rejected this world. As a second son, he was expected to make his living in the army, but, while attending Turin’s Royal Military Academy, he was frequently punished for rebelling against military routines. He was graduated in 1826 and served in the army for five years, while formulating increasingly liberal political views. After the revolution of 1830, in which Charles X of France was overthrown, Cavour was put under surveillance by Piedmontese authorities as a dangerous radical. In November, 1831, he resigned his commission.

Cavour was eager for a political career, but his ambitions remained blocked by Piedmont’s autocratic government for the next sixteen years. Instead, he engaged in various economic activities, such as supervising family estates; investing in new factories, banks, and railway companies; and speculating profitably in government securities and foreign exchange. He also devoted himself to the study of political and economic developments in Great Britain and France, visiting both countries periodically and acquiring a deep admiration for the ideas of Jeremy Bentham and the practices of François Guizot and Sir Robert Peel.

By the mid-1830’s, he had become an advocate of the juste milieu, or middle way, which he thought would obviate the dangers posed by the extremes of reaction and revolution. Specifically, he recommended a parliamentary government controlled by an educated, wealthy elite that would promote social progress by means of gradual, rational reform. Thus, after briefly espousing radical opinions in his youth, Cavour adopted a liberal-conservative stance that he maintained for the rest of his life.

Life’s Work

Cavour’s political opportunity finally arrived as a result of King Charles Albert’s reluctant reforms during the revolutionary atmosphere of the late 1840’s. In 1847, Cavour was one of the founders and the editor of a moderate liberal newspaper, Il Risorgimento . In 1848, he served on the commission that established a restricted parliamentary franchise similar to his own ideal and, in June, was elected to the Chamber of Deputies.

Initially, Cavour’s chances of rapid political advancement must have appeared slim, for he had neither parliamentary allies nor a commanding personal presence. He was short and stocky, with a round face, thinning, reddish hair, a scanty beard, and spectacles, and was more familiar with the French language than Italian, which he spoke imperfectly and unattractively. However, he proved an engaging character, self-confident, down-to-earth, humorous, and conscientious, with the somewhat racy image of an incorrigible gambler, a lifelong bachelor, and a womanizer.

More important, Cavour was a highly skilled politician, well versed in parliamentary practice, and an extremely penetrating, logical speaker. He quickly won the allegiance of conservatives by backing Massimo d’Azeglio’s center-right government and of leftists by supporting the Siccardi laws against ecclesiastical privileges. It thus came as no surprise when he was appointed minister of marine, commerce, and agriculture in October, 1850, added the Finance Ministry six months later, and became the dominant figure in the government. He was able to seize complete power in 1852, when Azeglio resigned in protest at the senate’s rejection of a civil-marriage bill. Cavour was a rationalist who generally sympathized with attempts to reduce the Church’s authority, but on this occasion he agreed to King Victor Emmanuel II’s demand that the bill be abandoned and was appointed prime minister on November 4.

During the early years of his premiership, Cavour concentrated on domestic affairs, attempting to convert backward Piedmont into the most progressive and powerful country in Italy. Accordingly, he resisted royal attempts to subvert parliament’s constitutional supremacy, resumed the attack on the Church by dissolving half of the monasteries in 1855, and increased military expenditure. In addition, he terminated Piedmont’s dependence on costly loans from the Rothschilds’ Paris bank and promoted economic growth by expanding bank credit; financing the development of mines, railways, and utilities; and maintaining tariff agreements that he had negotiated earlier as finance minister. As a result, Piedmont became the only liberal, reforming state in the peninsula and the acknowledged leader of the Italian national cause.

Cavour’s important contribution to that cause was a tribute to his remarkable flexibility and opportunism. At heart a Piedmontese nationalist, he was concerned to further the interests of his native state. To do so, he invariably opposed revolutionary efforts by republicans such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and Giuseppe Mazzini but otherwise was prepared to modify tactics and objectives in the light of experience and circumstances. During the 1840’s, he expected the Italians themselves to expel Austria and create a Turin-based, northern kingdom to the exclusion of the central and southern parts of Italy. Austria’s easy victories over Piedmont in 1849, however, convinced him that little could be achieved without foreign aid, and he carefully avoided hostilities until the Crimean War. Before its outbreak, Cavour was reluctant to meet British and French requests for help and did so in 1855 only in order to foil Victor Emmanuel’s plan to replace him with a more warlike minister. Nevertheless, participation in the war proved a boon.

On the one hand, the army’s creditable performance increased Piedmont’s prestige in Italy. On the other, at the Congress of Paris in 1856 Cavour raised the Italian question in an international forum for the first time and learned that Napoleon III was sympathetic to the idea of a moderately powerful, independent kingdom in northern Italy. Subsequently, he maintained contact with the emperor and, in 1858, negotiated the secret Pact of Plombières, committing France to send military assistance in return for territorial concessions if Cavour engineered a crisis in which Austria appeared the aggressor. He was able to do so in April, 1859, largely because of Austria’s foolish ultimatum demanding unilateral demobilization by Piedmont.

During the resultant war, stiff Austrian resistance led Napoleon to withdraw after two narrow victories and negotiate the Armistice of Villafranca with Emperor Francis Joseph. Cavour, who was not invited to the talks, was bitterly disappointed at the peace terms, which obliged Austria to cede only Lombardy and ordered the restoration to the central Italian duchies of absolutist rulers who had been ousted during the war and replaced by Piedmontese sympathizers. On learning that Victor Emmanuel had accepted the terms, he angrily resigned on July 11, 1859.

During the last two years of Cavour’s life, a series of unexpected developments enabled him to achieve goals he had previously dismissed as impracticable. While he was out of office, the faltering alliance with the French was replaced by British support. Foreign Minister Lord John Russell criticized the Villafranca agreement as unworkable, insisting that Italians be allowed to determine their own future, and pressured Victor Emmanuel into reinstating Cavour in January, 1860. On his return, he was thus fully confident that Piedmont’s control would soon be extended into central Italy.

In March, after Cavour had guaranteed Napoleon’s acquiescence by ceding Nice and Savoy to France, plebiscites were held in Modena, Parma, Romagna, and Tuscany, whose subjects voted overwhelmingly for annexation. At this juncture, Cavour looked for a lengthy period of peace in which the new territories could be consolidated, but his hopes were rudely shattered by Garibaldi’s startling conquest of Sicily and Naples between May and September, 1860. Desperate to prevent Italian leadership’s falling into popular, democratic hands, he first convinced Napoleon that his purpose was to protect the pope from advancing revolutionaries and then boldly sent the army south. Having taken Umbria and the Marche, the central and eastern parts of the Papal States, it entered Naples, where Garibaldi relinquished authority to Victor Emmanuel in late October. Subsequently, the people of Naples, the Marche, and Umbria voted for annexation by Piedmont.

In January, 1861, elections were held for a national parliament that, on March 17, gave the Italian crown to Victor Emmanuel. Tragically, Cavour was unable to enjoy the fruits of his triumph, for soon afterward he contracted a fever, probably malaria, and died on June 6, 1861.

Significance

Count Cavour’s achievements fully justify his reputation as one of the most successful statesmen in modern European history. In a mere eight years, he made Piedmont the leading Italian state and, with a rare combination of diplomatic skill, opportunism, and military daring, unified most of the peninsula. When he died, the only remaining independent territories were Venetia and Rome, which were added in 1866 and 1870.

However, Cavour’s legacy was by no means untarnished. Essentially, the process of unification entailed the imposition on all Italy of Piedmont’s political system, which gave power to the largely anticlerical upper middle class. In conjunction with Cavour’s seizure of papal territory, the extension of the political system contributed to the rift that was to divide church and state for the remainder of the century. It also aroused intense hostility among the thousands who had fought or voted for annexation expecting democracy, and aggravated the serious class and regional conflicts that racked Italian society. Equally detrimental were Cavour’s methods of controlling parliament, such as tampering with elections, invalidating unfavorable returns, and disarming opposition by giving office to its moderate elements. The latter practice underlay the connubio (marriage), which united Cavour’s moderate conservative deputies and Urbano Rattazzi’s center-left group from 1852 to 1857, when leftist electoral losses facilitated a return to the Right.

Such expedients enabled Cavour to establish a virtual dictatorship, unfettered by king, cabinet, or parliament. Whether he viewed them as temporary, emergency measures is unclear because he died so soon after the prolonged national crisis ended. After 1861, the imitation of these measures by less talented politicians produced many of the features that characterized later Italian politics, including a tendency to tolerate autocratic power, the absence of cabinet responsibility, and reliance on fluctuating centrist coalitions that survived only by avoiding controversial issues. Thus, Cavour can be viewed as the founder not only of the Italian state but also of traditions responsible for its chronic political weakness.

Bibliography

Blumberg, Arnold. A Carefully Planned Accident: The Italian War of 1859. Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1990. A history of the war against Austria, including Cavour’s role in provoking the conflict.

Coppa, Frank J. Camillo di Cavour. Boston: Twayne, 1973. A brief, well-written biography by an American Catholic scholar, focusing on aspects of Cavour’s career not normally stressed. Particularly useful for church-state relations and diplomacy prior to Plombières. Contains a detailed bibliography with some omissions.

Di Scala, Spencer. Italy from Revolution to Republic: 1700 to the Present. 3d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2004. Includes a section on the Risorgimento unification movement, with chapter 8 entitled “Cavour and the Piedmontese Solution.”

Hearder, Harry. Cavour. 2d ed. London: Historical Association, 1985. An updated version of a 1972 pamphlet. Provides an excellent introduction, with sections on Cavour’s life, opinions, and achievements, and a well-balanced assessment of his contribution to Italian history. Contains a useful, short bibliography.

Mack Smith, Denis. Cavour. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. A fully documented, lucid biography, containing much fresh information and new insights. Good on all aspects of Cavour’s life, particularly on economic policies and the development of his character. Contains a useful bibliographical note. Essential reading.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860: A Study in Political Conflict. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1954. Reprint. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985. A seminal work based on newly released archival material. Brilliantly clarifies the complex events of 1860, demonstrating the conflicts between Italian leaders and undermining traditional myths about Cavour. The 1985 reissue includes the author’s reflections on the controversy generated by the original edition.

Riall, Lucy. The Italian Risorgimento: State, Society, and National Unification. London: Routledge, 1994. A history of the Risorgimento unification movement and Cavour’s participation in it.

Whyte, A. J. The Early Life and Letters of Cavour, 1810-1848. London: Oxford University Press, 1925. A scholarly account of Cavour’s life before his entry into Parliament, making extensive use of his correspondence. Offers useful insights into his character and his preparations for a political career.

‗‗‗‗‗‗‗. The Political Life and Letters of Cavour, 1848-1861. London: Oxford University Press, 1930. The sequel to the above entry, with similar qualities. Deals with Cavour’s political career, emphasizing his diplomatic activities.