EgyptAir Flight 990 crash
EgyptAir Flight 990 was a tragic aviation disaster that occurred on October 31, 1999, when a Boeing 767, carrying 217 individuals, plunged into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after taking off from New York. All passengers onboard, including Americans, Egyptians, Canadians, and others, tragically lost their lives. Following the crash, extensive investigations were carried out by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Egyptian government, among others. The NTSB's final report, released in March 2002, concluded that the crash resulted from the actions of the copilot, Gamil el-Batouti, who allegedly performed irrational maneuvers while the captain was absent from the cockpit.
The investigation faced political sensitivities, as the Egyptian authorities disputed the findings, attributing the crash to mechanical failure or external sabotage rather than pilot actions. Various personal circumstances surrounding the copilot, including financial difficulties and potential career frustrations, were explored, but many questions remained unanswered. This incident strained U.S.-Egyptian relations, complicating the dynamics between the two nations, particularly in the context of EgyptAir's reliance on American aircraft for its fleet. The legacy of Flight 990 continues to evoke discussions around aviation safety, pilot training, and the impact of political contexts on investigative outcomes.
EgyptAir Flight 990 crash
The Event A New York-Cairo-bound flight crashes into the ocean, killing 217
Date October 31, 1999
Place About sixty miles south of Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, in the Atlantic Ocean
The federal government’s determination of intentional pilot action as the cause of the crash led to cultural and political controversy with Egypt, a strategic U.S. ally, and criticism by the Egyptian media and the public.
Around 2:00 a.m. on October 31, 1999, a giant twin-engine EgyptAir Boeing 767 aircraft with 217 people aboard, which had taken off from New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport following an eventless flight from Los Angeles, plunged mysteriously from 33,000 feet into the Atlantic Ocean without warning to air traffic control and in calm weather. At daybreak, some debris and human remains were found floating on the waves while the rest, it turned out, had settled on the 250-foot-deep ocean floor. All aboard—one hundred Americans, eighty-nine Egyptians, twenty-two Canadians, and others of diverse citizenship—were killed.
![U.S. Navy Lt. j.g. Jason S. Hall (right) watches as FBI Agent Duback (left) tags the cockpit voice recorder from EgyptAir Flight 990 on the deck of the USS Grapple (ARS 53) at the crash site. By Petty Officer 3rd Class Isaac D. Merriman, U.S. Navy. [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons 89112534-59183.jpg](https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/ers/sp/embedded/89112534-59183.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMNHX8kSepq84xNvgOLCmsE2epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS)
The Investigation and Differing Conclusions
There followed an extensive investigation by the federal National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), assisted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Boeing Aircraft Company, which built the aircraft, and Pratt and Whitney, which produced its engines. EgyptAir, the state-owned carrier, and the Egyptian government launched their own probes, even though Cairo had initially deferred to Washington in spearheading the inquiry, an option Egypt had since Flight 990 had crashed in international waters and the Egyptians, some five thousand miles away, did not have the resources for the job.
In its final report of March, 2002, the NTSB—stressing the evidence from the plane’s “black boxes” (the cockpit voice recorder and the instrument monitor), and after two years of intensive tests of the aircraft (many of them simulated)—found no physical malfunction whatsoever. Hence, the board concluded that pilot intervention was the cause of the crash. The report focused on the fact that while EgyptAir captain Ahmed el-Habashi was in the bathroom, his older copilot Gamil el-Batouti—presumably alone in the cockpit—performed irrational maneuvers such as disconnecting the autopilot and thus putting the aircraft under manual control, cutting back on the throttle and then shutting down the engines altogether, and pushing the control yoke forward to put the plane into a dive. As he did so, he repeatedly intoned in Arabic the equivalent of “I rely on Allah.” Apparently, when Habashi returned to the cockpit as the plane was plummeting, he asked why Batouti had shut off the engines. Habashi sought his help to pull back the control yoke to level the plane, but Batouti did the opposite. At first, according to the instrument recorder, the plane leveled off at 24,000 feet. It seemed to stall, but then resumed its dive before hitting the water.
Because of the tense political context, the final NTSB report avoided terms like “criminal act” or “suicide,” settling for a more muted “pilot intervention” as the cause of the crash. Still, Cairo insisted on mechanical malfunction or a bomb on board or a missile as a possible cause, stressing that devout Muslims like the first officer would not commit suicide for personal reasons any more than he had any ties to terrorism. Rather, the Egyptians hinted at anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias.
Anecdotes and Unanswered Questions
Some two dozen interviews with many who knew Batouti helped to form a composite but contradictory image of the copilot. It seems that Batouti, once a highly regarded flight-training instructor in the Egyptian air force who had attained the rank of major, had felt humiliated at having to accept a secondary role as copilot while younger men were already captains enjoying much higher pay. Others, however, reported that the copilot had been averse to applying for the promotion he felt coming to him, given his reluctance to accept greater responsibility and his uncertain command of English, the international language of air traffic.
Then there were stories about how Batouti, while from an affluent family, nevertheless was experiencing financial difficulties that led him to borrow money from various sources. One reason proposed was the expenses consequent on the care his ten-year-old daughter was receiving at the Los Angeles Medical Center for her lupus condition. Additionally, according to the testimony of an EgyptAir pilot who had unsuccessfully sought political asylum in Britain, Batouti had recently been reprimanded for alleged sexual misconduct at New York’s Pennsylvania Hotel, where a set of rooms was retained for EgyptAir personnel. Reportedly, his boss had threatened to delist the copilot from future flights to New York, which, because of the long distance, came with bonus pay for the crew. According to this information, the crash involved revenge, since that particular chief pilot was also on board the doomed flight.
There were more questions about these allegations than answers. For instance, the fifty-nine-year-old Batouti was three months away from mandatory retirement, which he had planned. On the other hand, why did Batouti, scheduled as a member of the relief crew, which customarily takes over mid-flight while the primary crew performs the takeoff and landing, insist on doing his stint early in the flight rather than wait for his shift a few hours later?
Impact
The investigation and many tests at Egypt’s insistence cost several million dollars. Besides the political controversy, there was another dimension to the crash and its investigation. EgyptAir had purchased many American Boeing aircraft for its fleet, and it would not have been good business to antagonize an American ally and major client. Still, U.S.-Egyptian relations did not heal for quite some time.
Bibliography
Langewiesche, William. “The Crash of EgyptAir 990.” The Atlantic Monthly, November, 2001, 41-52. Thorough reportage by a former working pilot discounting Egypt’s objections to the NTSB’s final report.
Malnic, Eric, et al. “EgyptAir Co-Pilot Caused ’99 Crash, NTSB to Say.” Los Angeles Times, March 15, 2002, p. A1. Factual and anecdotal coverage of the cause, leaning toward the NTSB’s account.
Pipes, Daniel. “EgyptAir Probe Uncovers Anti-Americanism.” The Wall Street Journal, November 24, 1999, p. A18. Inclined to believe conspiracy theories, the Egyptian airline, government, media, and public are receptive to seeing the hand of Israel, Jews, and their American allies behind the “hit” of Flight 990.