Miller v. California
Miller v. California is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case decided in 1973 that set important precedents regarding the definition and regulation of obscene material. The case arose when a defendant mailed sexually explicit materials to individuals who had not requested them, leading to his conviction under California law for distributing obscene content. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled that obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment but established a new three-part test for determining obscenity. This test assesses whether the average person, using local community standards, would find that the material appeals to prurient interests, is patently offensive, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The ruling marked a significant shift from previous standards, particularly in relation to the burden of proof for obscenity cases. Dissenting justices argued for broader protections for any material with even minimal social value, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding a wide range of ideas and expressions. This case continues to influence debates on free speech, obscenity, and community standards in the United States.
Miller v. California
Court: U.S. Supreme Court
Decided: June 21, 1973
Significance: In reaffirming the principle that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, this decision provided a new standard for defining obscenity
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966), a state court had banned the novel The Memoirs of Fanny Hill as obscene, although the court acknowledged that it might have some “minimal literary value.” The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that a book could be banned only if the dominant theme of its material, when considered as a whole, appeals to a prurient interest in sex; when the material patently offends contemporary community standards; and when the material is utterly without redeeming social value. The Supreme Court reversed the state court on the ground that, although Fanny Hill may have been offensive, it was not “utterly without redeeming social value.”
The 1973 Miller case involved a defendant who had mailed sexually explicit materials to persons who had neither requested them nor expressed interest in receiving such material. After some recipients complained to police, the defendant was convicted in a jury trial of violating a California law making it a misdemeanor knowingly to distribute obscene matter. On appeal a superior court in Orange Country affirmed the decision. However, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision by a 5-4 vote and remanded the case.
Chief Justice Warren Burger, joined by justices Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, and William H. Rehnquist, wrote the majority opinion. Burger cited the Court’s earlier holding in Roth v. United States (1957), that obscene materials are not protected by the First Amendment. He claimed that in the Memoirs case the Court had “veered sharply away from Roth” and produced a “drastically altered test.” According to Burger, Roth presumed that obscene material is, by definition, “utterly without social value,” while Memoirs required the prosecution to prove that challenged material is utterly valueless—a burden “virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.” Burger announced that the Court was returning to Roth and abandoning as “unworkable” the “utterly without redeeming social value” test of Memoirs.
Accordingly, Burger concluded that material is “obscene” and can be restricted if an average person applying local community standards—rather than uniform national standards—would find that it appeals to prurient interests; if the work is patently offensive; and if it lacks “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, as did Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., joined by Potter Stewart and Thurgood Marshall. While Burger claimed to be returning to the Roth test, these other justices argued that “ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance” should have full protection of the First Amendment. In their opinion, Burger’s more restrictive test extended First Amendment protection only to works of “serious value.”