Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union is a significant Supreme Court case that addressed issues of employment discrimination, specifically focusing on whether claims of racially motivated harassment by an employee could be pursued under Title 42, section 1981, originating from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The case arose from an African American woman's allegations of racial harassment in her workplace. Historically, section 1981 has been relied upon to combat racial discrimination in private and contractual relationships, with previous rulings like Runyon v. McCrary supporting its application.
In this case, the Supreme Court ultimately decided not to overturn the precedent set by Runyon but significantly narrowed the scope of section 1981, ruling by a 5-4 decision that it did not apply to discriminatory actions occurring after an employment contract had been formed. This decision led to considerable dissent within the Court and sparked national criticism. In response to the ruling's implications, Congress swiftly enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reinstated the broader protections that had been in place before Patterson. This case illustrates the ongoing complexities and challenges in the legal landscape regarding race and employment rights in America.
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
Date: June 15, 1989
Citation: 491 U.S. 164
Issue: Racial discrimination
Significance: The Supreme Court reargued this racial discrimination case, apparently intending to overturn a remaining provision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, but backed off in the face of widespread controversy.
In Patterson, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether an African American woman’s charge of racially motivated employment harassment was a cause of action under Title 42, section 1981, a surviving part of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The Court had used this provision of the 1866 act as a way of stopping racial discrimination in private and contractual relationships in Runyon v. McCrary (1976) and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968). The Court ordered a reargument and decided to determine whether Runyon should be overturned. Its action resulted in deep internal division and widespread criticism in the country. The majority believed there was need to issue a written defense of its reargument order in writing.
Upon reargument, the Court decided unanimously not to overturn Runyon but limited the scope of the ruling dramatically. The Court, however, ruled five to four that section 1981 did not apply to what an employer did after entering into a contract with an employee and, therefore, that the woman’s claims of racial harassment after her hiring did not fall under section 1981. Not only were there four dissents on this issue, but Congress quickly passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which restored the legal standard in use prior to the Patterson ruling.