Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union is a landmark Supreme Court case decided in 1997 that addressed the intersection of free speech and regulation of indecent materials on the Internet. The case revolved around the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, which aimed to protect minors from harmful content online but was criticized for its vague definitions of obscenity and indecency. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 7-2 majority, argued that the CDA did not provide adequate notice to users regarding what specific communications were prohibited, thereby infringing on First Amendment rights. The ruling emphasized that the law's definition of obscenity exceeded established standards from earlier cases and failed to account for materials with significant political, scientific, or educational value. While the government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from inappropriate content, the Court concluded that this interest does not justify restricting adult access to a broader range of materials. The dissenting opinions, however, supported the law's provisions aimed at limiting indecent communication between adults and minors. This case significantly shaped the legal landscape surrounding online speech and continues to influence discussions about regulation and free expression in the digital age.
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union
Date: June 26, 1997
Citation: 117 S.Ct. 2329
Issue: Freedom of speech
Significance: The Supreme Court struck down the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which had made it a felony to display “obscene or indecent” material over the Internet in ways that might make it available to minors.
After 1957 the Supreme Court often held that the First Amendment protected indecent materials but not obscene materials. Speaking for a 7-2 majority, Justice John Paul Stevens emphasized that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 did not adequately define obscenity and that it did not define indecency at all. Therefore, people using the Internet had no adequate notice of what specific communications were prohibited. The law’s definition of obscenity, moreover, went beyond the Court’s standards in Miller v. California (1973), and it did not guarantee protection for materials with serious political, scientific, or educational value. Although he recognized the government’s legitimate interest in protecting children from inappropriate expression, Stevens wrote that this objective did not justify limiting the access of adults to only materials that are appropriate for children. The two dissenters would have sustained those portions of the law that prohibited indecent communications from an adult to one or more minors.
