Race-to-the-bottom hypothesis
The race-to-the-bottom hypothesis posits that globalization leads countries, particularly those in the developing world, to engage in a competitive lowering of standards—both labor and environmental—in order to attract foreign investment. As governments attempt to maintain their tax bases, they may implement increasingly business-friendly regulations, which can often come at the cost of worker rights and ecological protections. Critics of this hypothesis suggest that while some regions may experience weakened standards temporarily, the long-term effects of investment may result in improved working conditions and environmental regulations as economies stabilize and evolve. They argue that such changes are part of the growing pains of industrialization, with the expectation that quality of life in developing regions will eventually align more closely with that of wealthier nations. Empirical evidence on this topic remains mixed, with some studies indicating a correlation between lower regulations and increased investment, while others highlight improvements in environmental standards in specific zones designed for export. Proponents of the race-to-the-bottom theory assert that the profit motives of investors and the inherently looser regulations in poorer areas create a realistic expectation for declining standards. Thus, the debate continues over the implications of globalization on labor rights and environmental health.
Subject Terms
Race-to-the-bottom hypothesis
Definition: Theory that the mobility of international capital pits workers and governments against one another in a competition to underbid and underregulate that results in increasingly primitive working conditions and increasingly lax environmental laws
If the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis is correct, the expected outcomes include widespread environmental deregulation and consequent degradation, especially in the developing world.
According to the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis, globalization dilutes not only the bargaining power of laborers but also the ability of governments to regulate industrial pollution. Desperate to build and maintain their tax bases, states in the developing world compete to appease capital sources with increasingly business-friendly and environment-hostile standards.
Critics of the hypothesis argue that while it may be the case that environmental regulations, working conditions, and pay may have weakened in some regions in the short run, some investment is almost always better than no investment, and the trend will inevitably reverse when market equilibrium has been neared, unemployment has sufficiently diminished, and a requisite degree of regulations have been enacted in an adequate number of states. Some also assert that the process is a necessary growing pain of industrialization, and the developing world’s quality of life and environmental integrity will continue to improve and eventually match that of the global North.
The empirical evidence is unclear. Anecdotal cases of capital flight can be cited, as well as Ireland’s notable attempt to attract capital by lowering environmental standards, and some studies have shown a negative correlation between regulation and investment. Other studies, however, have found environmental regulatory improvement in so-called export processing zones, where one might expect any actual race to the bottom to be most evident. Proponents of the theory, however, maintain that given the profit motive of investors and unquestionably looser restrictions in poorer regions, it is at least reasonable to expect market forces to encourage a suboptimal hovering near the middle, if not an all-out race to the bottom.