Seditious libel
Seditious libel is a legal concept originating from English common law that relates to the crime of publishing statements deemed to undermine government authority. This offense focused on preserving governmental respect and stability, asserting that criticism could constitute a criminal assault regardless of the truthfulness of the statements made. Historically significant in both colonial America and later U.S. law, the notion of seditious libel sparked important debates about freedom of the press. The famous trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 illustrated early resistance to this doctrine, as a jury found him not guilty for publishing truthful criticisms of a colonial governor. Despite its presence in American law through the late 18th century, political tensions led to the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, which criminalized disparaging remarks against government officials. Over time, public backlash against such laws contributed to a shift towards a more expansive view of press freedoms, culminating in landmark Supreme Court cases that established protections for political speech. Although seditious libel is rarely prosecuted today, its historical context reflects ongoing discussions about the balance between government authority and freedom of expression in a democratic society.
Subject Terms
Seditious libel
SIGNIFICANCE: Reaction against the concept of seditious libel contributed significantly to the growth of a broader concept of freedom of the press.
Part of the common-law heritage of American justice, the crime of seditious libel gave way to a more libertarian view of the press’s role in American politics. The concept of seditious libel developed as part of English common law and was transplanted to the American colonies. Primarily concerned with the preservation of government, it viewed criticism that tended to lower the respect of the people for government as a criminal “assault.” Under the doctrine of seditious libel, it did not matter if the offending words were true; indeed, since damaging words based on truth were likely to be more effective, the law held that “the greater the truth, the greater the libel.” In seditious libel trials, the role of the jury was limited to determining the fact of publication. The judge determined whether the words were libelous.
![Sedition Act (1798). Sedition Act of 1798. By United States Federal Government (http://www.ourdocuments.gov/) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons 95343082-20498.jpg](https://imageserver.ebscohost.com/img/embimages/ers/sp/embedded/95343082-20498.jpg?ephost1=dGJyMNHX8kSepq84xNvgOLCmsE2epq5Srqa4SK6WxWXS)
Prosecutions for seditious libel were relatively rare in colonial America, though the concept did give rise to one of the eighteenth century’s most famous trials. In 1735, John Peter Zenger , printer of the New York Weekly Journal, was charged with seditious libel for his criticisms of the colony’s governor. Though Zenger admitted that he had published the offending material, he maintained that it was true and that truth was an adequate defense. Despite the judge’s determination that his words were libelous, the jury refused to convict Zenger and found him not guilty. His resultant popularity may well have discouraged other prosecutions.
Seditious Libel and Partisan Politics
Seditious libel was still a crime when the Bill of Rights was adopted in 1791, and contemporary opinion seems to have held that the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press did not eliminate it. Freedom of the press was held primarily to mean that there should be no censorship before publication, or “prior restraint.” After publication, authors and printers could be held accountable for what was published. In the heightened tensions of the nation’s first party system in the 1790’s, the Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans criticized each other in the press in terms that ranged from the vigorous to the scurrilous.
Fearing that their opponents threatened the very stability of the government, the Federalists persuaded Congress to pass the Sedition Act of 1798 . This act made it a crime to bring the president or Congress into disrepute. It also modified the law of seditious libel to allow truth as a defense and to permit juries to determine whether a publication was libelous. The act was employed in a very partisan manner: All those prosecuted under it were Republicans; all the judges were Federalists. Thomas Jefferson and his followers argued that the law was unconstitutional. The act expired in 1800, and after Jefferson’s election to the presidency in 1800, Congress repaid the fines of those convicted under the act. The Sedition Act created a strongly negative reaction in public opinion. While the act never came before the Supreme Court and seditious libel was never formally repudiated, the increasingly democratic nature of American politics ensured that any government initiating a seditious libel prosecution would be subject to ridicule. For the next century little was heard of the crime.
Later History of Seditious Libel
Though the common-law crime of seditious libel was seldom used as the basis of prosecutions, the attitude that the federal government needed protection from the writings of subversives surfaced periodically in the twentieth century, particularly during times of crisis. During World War I, the Espionage Act of 1917 made a variety of forms of antigovernment expression illegal, particularly after it was amended by a new sedition act in 1918. During the Cold War, the Smith Act of 1940 was used to prosecute the leaders of the American Communist Party partly on the grounds that the party’s publications had seditious purposes. As late as the 1960’s, efforts were made by opponents of the Civil Rights movement to use the law of libel to silence their opponents in the press. The Supreme Court’s decision in New York Times Company v. Sullivan (1964), however, established the principal that political figures had to prove “actual malice” rather than mere inaccuracy to sustain a charge of libel.
Though seditious libel has never been declared a dead letter, the absence of its use and the relative rarity of other prosecutions utilizing the concept of sedition are a mirror of the extent to which American government has come to accept the view that vigorous public debate, including strong criticism of the government and its officials, is necessary to the existence of a free society.
Bibliography
Brill, Stephen. Trial By Jury. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990. Study of jury decisions in libel cases that shows the difficulty jurors face when asked to apply the actual malice test.
Kalven, Harry. “The New York Times Case: A Note on ‘The Central Meaning of the First Amendment’” Supreme Court Review (1964): Analysis of the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan by one of the foremost First Amendment scholars of that era.
Lee, Douglas E. "Seditious Libel." Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University, 2 July 2024, firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/seditious-libel/. Accessed 11 July 2024.
Levy, Leonard, Kenneth Karst, and Dennis Mahoney. The First Amendment. New York: Macmillan, 1990. Exploration of the role that the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights has played in fostering free expression in American history.
Lewis, Anthony. Make No Law. New York: Random House, 1991. Very readable case study of the Supreme Court’s 1964 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan ruling.
"Libel." Cornell Law School, June 2023, www.law.cornell.edu/wex/libel. Accessed 11 July 2024.
Van Alstyne, William. First Amendment: Cases and Materials. 2d ed. Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1995. Broad study of the protections provided by the First Amendment, with numerous examples of court rulings.